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Abstract
Democratic decision-making is often defended on grounds of the wisdom of crowds:
decisions are more likely to be correct if they are based on many independent opinions,
so a typical argument in social epistemology. But what does it mean to have independ-
ent opinions? Opinions can be probabilistically dependent (threatening the wisdom
of crowds) even if individuals form their opinion in causal isolation from each other.
We distinguish four probabilistic notions of opinion independence. Which of them
holds depends on how individuals are causally a¤ected by environmental factors such
as commonly perceived evidence. In a general theorem, we identify causal conditions
guaranteeing each kind of opinion independence. These results have implications for
whether and how wisdom of crowdsarguments are possible, and how truth-conducive
institutions can be designed.
1 Introduction
When an individual forms opinions on factual questions and aims for correctness, it is
often benecial to adopt the opinion of an expert, a person with a high probability of
being right. No doubt, such dependence on someone who knowsis a smart epistemic
strategy from an individual perspective. At the same time, the dependence created
by deference to experts will often have bad epistemic implications once we care about
the ability of the group to form correct opinions. If many individuals follow experts,
a set of dependent opinions is the result.
According to the popular idea of the wisdom of crowds, a decision based on many
opinions is more likely to be correct than one based on just a few. Much of the trust in
the judgment of large electorates, for instance, comes from the idea that a judgment
is likely to be correct if it is approved by many voters. A single witness may well
be mistaken, but twenty witnesses who all say the same may not, so the intuition.
But these arguments assume that the group aggregates (su¢ ciently) independent
individual opinions. Consider, for contrast, an extreme case of dependence: if all
individuals were to adopt the opinion of the same expert, their opinions would be
fully dependent, and the group would be no more competent than the expert. But
if the individuals form independent opinions and are all at least somewhat better
1The formal results presented in this paper are the work of Franz Dietrich.
than random at identifying the correct answer, then, as the famous Condorcet Jury
Theorem tells us, the probability of the majority opinion being correct will increase
with group size and converges to 1. Thus, the wisdom of crowdshinges crucially on
opinion independence.
Thinking about opinion independence reveals a systematic di¤erence between in-
dividual and social epistemology. Generally speaking, individual epistemology recom-
mends dependent opinions (in the form of positive correlation with experts), social
epistemology recommends independent opinions. Pathologies of social opinion form-
ation, such as informational cascades, biases and the inuence of opinion leaders, are
all instances of harmful opinion dependence. Therefore, if we are interested in collect-
ive rather than individual knowledge, we need institutions to ensure that individuals
form independent opinions, possibly at a loss of individual epistemic success. (We
also need a suitable aggregation procedure to use the independent opinions e¤ectively,
but aggregation is largely beyond the scope of this paper.2)
But what exactly does it mean to have independent opinions? First of all, one
should not confuse causal and probabilistic independence. The former states that
the opinions do not causally a¤ect each other, the latter that they display no prob-
abilistic dependencies (correlations). Ultimately, it is probabilistic not causal
independence which matters for the wisdom of crowds, i.e., for the probability of
correct aggregate opinions. Yet, as we argue, whether and in what way opinions
are probabilistically (in)dependent is very much determined by causal interconnec-
tions between individuals and their environment. This paper distinguishes between
di¤erent notions of probabilistic independence, and assesses which notion applies,
depending on the underlying causal relations between individuals and other factors.
Assessing the epistemic quality of social practices and institutions is at the heart
of social epistemology. Perhaps the simplest practice for forming collective opinions
is voting. While we address voting, our analysis is much more general. The inde-
pendence of opinions matters whenever collective opinion formation, of whatever sort,
takes place. Group deliberation is a core example.
Some of the notions of independence developed in this paper lend themselves to
jury theorems. Such theorems make independence and competence assumptions and
conclude that crowds are wise, in the sense that the probability of a correct ma-
jority view increases as the group size increases (e.g., Grofman et al. 1983, Nitzan
and Paroush 1984, List and Goodin 2001, Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006, Atkinson
and Romeijn forthcoming, Hawthorne unpublished). The problem of opinion inde-
pendence is tackled by several scholars. Among the many technical contributions
are Boland (1989), Boland et al. (1989), Ladha (1992, 1993, 1995), Berg (1993) and
Kaniovski (2010). But independence has also been discussed less formally in political
philosophy, especially with reference to epistemic and deliberative democracy. Con-
tributions include Grofman and Feld (1988), Estlund et al. (1989), Estlund (1994,
2008), Anderson (2006), Vermeule (2009, ch. 1) and Spiekermann and Goodin (2010).
We approach the independence problem from a causal angle, which is crucial for gain-
ing a deeper understanding of independence. To do so, we draw on causal networks.
2The Condorcet Jury Theorem, for instance, considers majority voting, a particular aggregation
procedure for the case of dichotomous decisions.
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Causal network reasoning has been employed before in the context of jury theorems
(see Dietrich and List 2004, Dietrich 2008, Dietrich and Spiekermann 2010), but a
general account of probabilistic independence in terms of causal interactions is still
missing. In assuming an external standard for an opinions correctness, we are in line
with the correspondence theory of truth and Alvin Goldmans inuential veritism
approach in social epistemology (Goldman 1999, 59, 79¤.; 2004).
2 Four di¤erent independence conditions and their causal
motivations
We assume that some individuals, labelled i = 1; 2; 3; :::, must form opinions on a
given issue.3 This might arise in the context of deciding between two alternatives,
such as: convict or acquit the defendant in a court trial, predict that global warming
will continue or that it will not, and so on. The opinions may, for instance, serve
as votes in a formal voting procedure, or as inputs into group deliberation. It is
easiest to think of an opinion as taking one of just two possible forms, such as a
yesor noanswer to a factual question, or a guiltyor innocentvote in a jury.
All our illustrations will follow this binary base-line case (as does the literature on
jury theorems). But our model is much more general: opinions need not be binary
and might for instance be sets of believed propositions (belief sets or judgment sets),
numerical estimates (say, of the height of a mountain), or perhaps even degrees of
belief. Exactly one opinion is correct, rightor better. Which opinion is correct
is determined by an external fact, which is called the state (of the world) and is
denoted x.4 For instance, the opinion the defendant is innocent is correct if and
only if the defendant has not committed the crime in question. Again, we shall
mainly think of the state as taking one of only two possible forms, such as yesor
noas the factually correct answer to a given question, following common practice in
the literature (although the model places no restrictions on the possible forms of the
state). What matters is that the state determines which opinion is correct, so that
correctness supervenes on the state. Each person holds exactly one opinion; it might
be correct or incorrect.
In our probabilistic framework, phenomena such as the state and the opinions
are outcomes of random variables (with an underlying probability function denoted
Pr). We thus consider a random variable x generating the state of the world, and
random variables o1; o2, ... generating the opinions of individuals 1, 2, ... Note our
convention of using bold face letters to denote random variables. So, the variable
x ranges over the set of possible states, and each oi ranges over the set of possible
opinions. What these sets are taken to be depends on the application; for instance,
opinions might take the value guiltyor innocent, and the state the value crime
3The total number of individuals does not matter for us. Technically, it may even be taken to be
countably innite.
4Di¤erent notions of objectivity are compatible with that assumption, as long as the fact about
the correct opinion is not determined by the actual opinions of people. This excludes procedural
notions of correctness, where an opinion is correct if and because it matches the opinion that arose
collectively by applying an appropriate procedure.
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committedor crime not committed.5
The simplest independence assumption one might come up with refrains from
conditionalising on any background information:
Unconditional Independence (UI). The opinions o1; o2; ::: are unconditionally
independent.
Counterexamples to UI are easily constructed. In a context of voting between two
alternatives, a and b, the information that the rst ten voters vote for a plausibly
raises the probability that voter 11 votes for a formally, Pr(o11 = ajo1 = o2 = ::: =
o10 = a) > Pr(o11 = a) because the ten rst votes strongly indicate that the state
makes a correct (assuming that voters are reasonably competent in voting for the
correct alternative), which in turn suggests that voter 11 also votes for a. But this is
a violation of UI, whereby opinions should not be of any informational relevance to
each other.
Note that this argument implicitly assumes the state x has a causal e¤ect on each
opinion, as indicated in Figure 1. In this (and all following) plots, only two opinions
Figure 1: The state is a direct cause of the opinions.
are shown for simplicity. The arrows represent causal relationships, pointing from the
causing variable to the a¤ected variable. In Figure 1 the opinions are probabilistically
dependent throughtheir common cause x.
That UI is easily violated should not surprise scholars familiar with the Condorcet
Jury Theorem, given that this theorem does not assume that votes are uncondition-
ally independent but that they are state-conditionally independent. What is more
surprising is that UI does hold in some circumstances, but we postpone this issue for
now and turn to the more classical state-conditional notion of independence:
State-Conditional Independence (SI). The opinions o1; o2; ::: are independent
conditional on the state x.6
5The way in which the correct opinion supervenes on the state is expressible by a correctness
function c from the set X of possible states to the set O of possible opinions, mapping each state x
in X to the corresponding correct opinion c(x).
6Conditional independence is dened like independence but with probabilities replaced by condi-
tional probabilities. More precisely, as long as x is discrete (e.g., binary), independence conditional
on x by denition means that for every value x which x may take (with positive probability) there
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This conditional notion of independence is the basis of Condorcets classical jury
theorem (e.g., Grofman et al., 1983), which can be summarized as follows. Suppose
a group performs a majority vote between two alternatives of which exactly one
is correct. The correct alternative corresponds to our state x, and the votes to
our opinions o1; o2, ... Condorcets jury theorem makes an independence and a
competence assumption. The former is simply SI. The latter is that, for every state
x, the state-conditional probability of correctly voting for x exceeds 12 (and is the same
for each voter). Under these premises, the theorem concludes that the probability of
a correct majority outcome increases in (odd) group size and converges to one.
State-Conditional Independence says that once we know the state of the world the
opinions do not anymore bear any information on each other. The earlier objection
to UI namely that the opinions of some of the people tell us something about what
the state is likely to be, and hence about what other people are likely to believe
does not work against SI because we can not learn anything new about the state if
we have already conditionalised on it. The state plays the role of a common cause
of the opinions. If the state is indeed the only common cause, SI is in line with
Reichenbachs famous Common Cause Principle, which is often understood roughly
as follows: if a common cause fully explains the correlations between certain events,
then these events are independent conditional on the common cause (Reichenbach
1956, 159-60). In slightly more general terms:
Common Cause Principle (stated informally). Phenomena which do not caus-
ally a¤ect each other are probabilistically independent conditional on their common
causes.
While the Common Cause Principle at rst sight supports SI, it can be turned
against SI once we consider other causal networks in which x is not the only common
cause of the opinions. Consider for instance the network in Figure 2. Here the
opinions have two common causes, the state x and another cause c, which could
be a factor like weather or room temperature. SI can now fail in much the same
way as UI. Suppose for instance that weather has an e¤ect on each juror in a court
trial: the sunnier weather is, the more the jurors see the good in the defendant, and
hence the more they are inclined to form the opinion that the defendant is innocent.
Now, even after having conditionalised on the state of the world that the defendant
is innocent, the opinions of the jurors are informative on each another, this time
through the common cause of weather; for instance, innocentopinions by the rst
ten jurors increase the probability that weather is sunny and hence the probability
that juror 11 has the opinion innocent too. In other words, the opinions are not
state-conditionally independent but state-conditionally positively correlated, namely
is independence under the conditional probability function Pr(jx). Without discreteness restriction,
the opinions are independent conditional on x if they are independent under the conditional prob-
ability measure Pr(jx) for all values x that the random variable x may take, except possibly from
a set of values of x that occurs with zero probability. (The clause except... appears for technical
reasons related to the general mathematical denition of conditional probabilities, which takes care
of the case in which x takes some or even all of its values with zero probability. We spare the reader
the technicalities.)
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Figure 2: Multiple direct common causes of opinions.
through the other common cause (weather) on which SI fails to conditionalise.
This discussion suggests replacing SI by a notion of independence which condi-
tionalises on all common causes of the opinions. By doing so we control for all
factors that causally a¤ect more than one opinion, eliminating the dependence in-
duced by such common factors. To state such a condition formally, let us extend the
formal framework, which so far consists just of the state x and the opinions o1, o2, ...
Now we consider these and any number of additional random variables (representing
phenomena which are directly or indirectly causally related to the opinions), and we
consider a causal network over the variables. Formally, a causal network over some
variables is a so-called directed acyclic graph over these variables, that is, a set of
directed arrows between pairs of variables (representing causal relevance) such that
there is no directed cycle of arrows.7 Figures 1 or 2 are examples of how the network
might look like. Figure 3 is yet another example. Here, the state causally a¤ects a
Figure 3: The state is an indirect common cause of opinions.
variable c, which is interpretable as evidence (e.g., ngerprints, witness reports, etc.)
and which in turn inuences each opinion. Individuals are thus a¤ected by the state
only indirectly, via the tracewhich the state leaves in the form of c. The additional
variables (such as the variable c in Figures 2 and 3) may be binary or multi-valued.
For instance, the variable weather may take the values sunny, cloudy, rainyand
so on; and the variable body of evidencemay take several forms as well. Some
variables (such as room temperature) might even range over a continuum of values.
7For thorough discussions of causal networks, see Pearl 2000, ch. 1.
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In the causal network, a variable a is said to be a direct cause of another b (and
b a direct e¤ect of a) if there is an arrow pointing from a towards b (a ! b).
Further, a is a cause of b (and b an e¤ect of a) if there is a directed path from a
to b, i.e., a sequence of two or more variables starting with a and ending with b
such that each of these variables (except from the last one) directly causes the next
one. For instance, in Figure 3 the state x directly causes c, and indirectly causes the
opinions. (When we use the verb causewe refer only to causal contribution; no
su¢ ciency or necessity is implied.) A variable is a common cause (e¤ect) of some
variables if it is a cause (e¤ect) of each of them. By a common causesimpliciter
we mean a common cause of (two or more) opinions. In all gures, such common
causes are shown in grey. While in Figures 1-3 all causes of opinions are common
causes, Figure 4 contains four private causes of opinions; they causally a¤ect just one
opinion. Note also that in Figure 4 some of the causes of opinions (namely, c2, c4
Figure 4: Private and common causes of opinions.
and c6) are non-evidential: they are not related to the state. Although this might be
viewed as irrational, individuals are often inuenced by non-evidential causes such
as room temperature (a common non-evidential cause) or the quality of ones sleep
last night (a private non-evidential cause).
Let us write  (Greek chi) for the family of all common causes. In Figure 1 
consists just of the state x; in Figures 2 and 3 of x and c; and in Figure 4 of x, c3
and c4. In general,  is a compound random variable with as many parts as there
are common causes of opinions.8 We are now ready to state a new independence
assumption, which is a direct application of the Common Cause Principle:
Common-Cause-Conditional Independence (CI). The opinions o1; o2; ::: are
independent conditional on the common causes .
This independence assumption may seem the most appealing one. It is backed by
the Common Cause Principle and more generally by probabilistic theories of causality.
8The range of  is the Cartesian product of the ranges of the common causes of opinions.
7
With CI, the independence of opinions is guaranteed as long as the opinions do
not causally a¤ect each other. It has, however, a weakness when applied in social
epistemology, where we would like to feed opinion independence into an argument
for the wisdom of crowds. The problem with CI is not so much that it is not
su¢ ciently justied CI is perhaps the most justiable independence assumption
but rather that CI (like UI) is a premise which does not always lend itself to the kind
of conclusions one is interested in.
To understand why, it is important to rst realize that what matters ultimately
is not independence of the opinions but rather independence of the events of correct
opinions. The typical argument for the wisdom of crowdssays that a group whose
members are independently more likely to get it right will quite probably get it
right in majority. This argument involves independence of the events of holding
correct opinions, not independence of the opinions (or votes) simpliciter. The kind
of conclusion that independence of opinions simpliciter lends itself to is di¤erent and
less relevant. One might reason that a group of jurors who are independently more
likely to express the opinion innocentwill quite probably hold the majority opinion
innocent. But what matters is less how likely a majority holds this opinion, but how
likely it holds the correct opinion.
Now, independence of the opinions implies independence of the correct opinion
events once we have conditionalised on the state x. It is easy to see why: conditional
on the state being x, if the opinions o1; o2; ::: are independent then the events that o1
matches x; o2 matches x; ::: are independent, too. In other words, the assumption of
State-Conditional Independence implies what is needed for wisdom of crowds-type
arguments, namely that events of correct opinions are independent across people.
Hence, the independence assumption SI does not have the aw of not pertaining to
the events of correct opinions (which is why Condorcets classical jury theorem is
based on SI rather than on UI). Similarly, if it so happens that the state x features
among the common causes  as it does indeed in all of the above Figures 1-4 then
Common-Cause-Conditional Independence does not have the aw either, as it then
implies independence of the correct opinion events conditional on the common causes.
But there are plausible situations in which the state x is not a common cause. Figure
5 is one such case. Here the common cause c a¤ects both the state and the opinions.
Figure 5: The state is not a cause of opinions.
As a plausible example, imagine a murder case in which the jurors learn that the
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defendant has bought cyanide (represented by c). This fact is a common cause of the
opinions of the jurors, who take murder (and guilt) to be more likely if the defendant
has bought cyanide in advance. Since having bought cyanide facilitates poisoning,
the purchase causally a¤ects not just the opinions but also whether the murder takes
place; hence the network of Figure 5. Note that state x is not a cause of any opinions.
Whenever the state x is not a common cause, CI does not conditionalise on it, and
therefore does not lend itself to arguments about the probability of correct majority
judgments, i.e., about the wisdom of the crowds. So we have to add the state into
the conditionalisation, just as Condorcets jury theorem conditionalises on the state
by using SI rather than UI. In total, we thus have to conditionalise on all common
causes plus the state. But what does this mean? Following Dietrich (2008) and
Dietrich and Spiekermann (2010), the decision problem faced by the group can be
conceptualized as being a description of two things:
 the fact to nd out about, conceptualized as the state of the world;
 the circumstances (environment) in which people search, conceptualized as the
common causes inuencing the opinions.
If we conditionalise on the decision problem, we include the state by default, thus
making sure that not only the opinions but also the events of correct opinions are
independent. We therefore have to conditionalise on the decision problem in the just-
dened sense. Formally, let us write  for the decision problem dened as a family
containing the state x and all common causes. Clearly, the problem  reduces to the
common causes  if the state is a common cause (as in Figures 1-4). In general  is
isomorphic to the state-circumstances pair (x;).9 We are now in a position to state
our nal independence condition:
Problem-Conditional Independence (PI). The opinions o1; o2; ::: are independ-
ent conditional on the problem .
3 The causal foundation of each independence condition:
a general theorem
While the last section has given informal causal motivations for the four independ-
ence conditions, this section turns to a formal result. The result gives us precise
su¢ cient (and in fact essentially necessary) conditions on causal interconnections for
each independence condition to hold. Given this result, once we know the individuals
causal environment we can infer which kinds of opinion independence should (not) be
assumed. And if a social planner can design the environment, he can do so to induce
the kind of independence he aims for.
To be able to infer probabilistic features from causal interconnections, one must
of course assume that probabilities are compatible with the causal network. What
such compatibility amounts to has been settled precisely in the theory of causal (and
Bayesian) networks (e.g., Pearl 2000). Formally, probabilities (more precisely: the
9This pair contains the state twice if the state is among the common causes, but such a redundancy
poses no problem.
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joint probability distribution of the variables) are compatible with the causal network
if the so-called (Parental) Markov Condition holds: any variable in the network is
independent of its non-e¤ects10 conditional on its direct causes. For instance, in
Figure 1 opinion o1 is independent of opinion o2 conditional on the direct cause x;
in Figure 2, o1 is independent of o2 given its direct causes x and c; in Figure 3, o1
is independent of both o2 and x conditional on the only direct cause c; and so on.
Note the importance of causal independence between the opinions for (probabilistic)
opinion independence: if o1 had a causal e¤ect on o2 then the Markov Condition
would not imply that o1 is conditionally independent of o2.
The following theorem gives causal conditions for our last two independence con-
ditions; the rst two conditions are dealt with by a corollary below.
Theorem 1. Suppose probabilities are compatible with the causal network, and no
opinion is a cause of any other opinion. Then:
(a) Common-Cause-Conditional Independence holds;
(b) Problem-Conditional Independence holds if the state is not a common e¤ect of
any opinions or private causes thereof.
Part (a) is an instance of the Principle of Common Cause and as such should come
without surprise to specialists.11 Part (b) settles the question of how the state should
(not) be causally related to the opinions in order for independence to be preserved
after conditionalising also on the state (in addition to the common causes). The
condition stated in part (b) requires that the state is not a common e¤ect of variables
each of which is or privately causes a di¤erent opinion.12
Figure 6 gives counterexamples in which the state x is such a common e¤ect.
In 6a we see a causal setup where the state is a common e¤ect of the opinions.
Figure 6: Violations of the condition for Problem-Conditional Independence.
A causal structure like 6a arises if the opinions inuence the state. For instance,
10With the non-e¤ects of a variable a we mean the variables which are not e¤ects of a (and di¤er
from a).
11We nonetheless present a formal proof of part (a), given that standard renderings of the Common
Cause Principle are often less general than our application in that they focus on (in)dependence
between only two random variables and often assume that there is only one common cause. We
allow several opinions and common causes.
12Equivalently, none of the following three cases obtains: (i) two (or more) opinions cause the state
(as in Figure 6a); (ii) private causes of two (or more) opinions cause the state (as in Figure 6b); (iii)
an opinion and a private cause of a di¤erent opinion cause the state.
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the prediction of a bank run might cause the bank run. Though interesting and
sometimes very real, such cases violate one of the core assumptions of many theories
of social epistemology (at least among those committed to a correspondence theory
of truth): the assumption that an external fact determines correctness and not vice
versa. Self-fullling propheciesare ruled out.
In Figure 6b, by contrast, the state is a common e¤ect of private causes of opinions.
To show the relevance of such a setup, we need a more complex example. Suppose
an intelligence agency observes two di¤erent subjects at di¤erent ends of the town.
The agency knows from reliable sources that if and only if both subject 1 leaves the
house at noon (c1) and subject 2 leaves the house at noon (c2), the two subjects will
have a conspiratory meeting (x). One agent observes subject 1, another subject 2,
and for security reasons they cannot directly communicate with each other. Both
agents form opinions on whether the meeting will take place. Each agents opinion
is inuenced only by his own observation (either c1 or c2), so that these two causes
inuence both the opinions and the state. This example shows that 6b is a plausible
causal setup, but like for 6a the condition in clause (b) of Theorem 1 is violated and
Problem-Conditional Independence should not be assumed. Indeed, PI is intuitively
violated: conditional on the state, we can infer something about an agents opinion
if we learn about other opinions. For instance, if we know that the conspiratory
meeting does not take place (we condition on x being no meeting) and we learn
that agent 1 believes that the meeting will take place, we can infer that subject 1 has
left the house. But since there is no meeting, we also infer that subject 2 stays at
home and that agent 2 holds the corresponding opinion. We have learned something
about 2s opinion from 1s opinion, a violation of PI. A plausible notion of opinion
independence in cases like 6a and 6b must not conditionalise on the state. Therefore,
only Common-Cause-Conditional Independence and hence somewhat surprisingly,
as there are no common causes Unconditional Independence hold.
Although Theorem 1 seems to deal only with two of our independence conditions
(CI and PI), an immediate corollary of part (a) gives us causal conditions for our
other two independence conditions:
Corollary. Suppose probabilities are compatible with the causal network, and no
opinion is a cause of any other opinion. Then:
 State-Conditional Independence holds if only the state is a common cause;
 Unconditional Independence holds if there are no common causes at all.
Notice how strong the causal conditions for SI and UI are. Among the above
gures, only Figure 1 satises the condition for SI that the state is the only common
cause, and only Figures 6a and 6b satisfy the no common causecondition for UI. It
might surprise that there exist plausible causal interconnections for which UI holds.
Figure 6b is such a plausible network, as discussed above.
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4 Conclusion
The widespread conceptual confusion about the notion of independence has hindered
progress in assessing whether and when crowds are wise. It largely explains the
disagreements in social epistemology about whether jury theorems have any relev-
ance. Only by understanding causal interrelations is a proper analysis of opinion
independence possible.
This paper distinguishes between four distinct notions of independence, as sum-
marized in Table 1. This table highlights our two dimensions of categorization. To
Table 1: Di¤erent notions of independence.
explicit state-conditionalization?
yes no
explicit common- yes PI CI
cause-conditionalization? no SI UI
make a notion of independence realistic, the conditionalisation has to include the com-
mon causes; to make it suitable for jury theorems (or wisdom of crowdsarguments),
the conditionalisation has to include the state of the world. State-Conditional Inde-
pendence is the commonly used notion in orthodox statements of Condorcets jury
theorem. Common-Cause-Conditional Independence is new and most generally de-
fensible from the perspective of the theory of causal networks: it applies always as
long as the opinions do not causally a¤ect each other. Problem-Conditional Independ-
ence was recently introduced in Dietrich and Spiekermann (2010). If Unconditional
Independence does not appear in the literature, it is probably because most schol-
ars take it to be obviously false; but surprisingly we nd plausible causal setups in
which this simplest of all independence assumptions is justied. Theorem 1 and its
corollary give formal causal-network-theoretic foundations for each of the four in-
dependence assumptions. These results suggest that the causal conditions for the
classical State-Conditional Independence assumption are quite special and of limited
real-world signicance. One will usually have to go beyond classical independence to
make sound arguments in support of the wisdom of crowds.
As already indicated, those independence assumptions which conditionalise on
the state of the world x (and perhaps on more) State-Conditional and Problem-
Conditional Independence lend themselves to formal arguments for the wisdom
of crowds, i.e., jury theorems. Such arguments require a competence assumption
compatible with its independence assumption. State-Conditional Independence is
the basis of Condorcets classical jury theorem, explained above. As for Problem-
Conditional Independence, Dietrich and Spiekermann (2010) prove a corresponding
jury theorem, with a problem-conditional rather than state-conditional competence
assumption. Much further work is needed to develop the causal approach. We leave
it as a future challenge to develop jury theorems for the aggregation of non-binary
opinions, such as judgment sets or degrees of belief.
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A Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
Assume that probabilities are compatible with causal interconnections (in the sense
of the Parental Markov Condition) and no opinion is a cause of another opinion.
We rst prove part (a) and then part (b). The informal idea in both proofs is that
dependence between opinions can only arise if information can travel along a path
in the network without the path being blockedby the variables on which one con-
ditionalises. The formal denition of blocking(or d-separating) and the theorem
whereby such blocking implies conditional independence are borrowed from the the-
ory of causal networks, where they play a central role. Throughout we write C for
the set of common causes.
Proof of part (a). We have to show that the opinions are independent conditional
on C. By the blocking theoremin the theory of causal networks (e.g., Pearl, 2000,
Theorem 1.2.4) it su¢ ces to show that C blocks every path from an opinion to another
opinion, in the usual technical sense that for any such path
(i) either the path contains a chain a! b! cor fork a b! csuch that b
is in C
(ii) or the path contains a collider a ! b  csuch that b is not in C and does
not cause any variable in C.
To show this, consider any path from an opinion oi to another opinion oj . Call
the path (a1;a2; :::;am), where m ( 2) is the number of variables in the path and
a1 = oi and am = oj . By denition of a path, any two neighbours at;at+1 are
connected by an arrow, of the form at ! at+1or at  at+1.
Case 1 : the arrow between a1 and a2 points towards a2 (a1 ! a2). It is impossible
that between all neighbouring variables at;at+1 the arrow points towards at+1, since
otherwise oi would be a cause of oj . Let at be the earliest variable in the path such
that an arrow points from at+1 to at. Notice the collider at 1 ! at  at+1. It is
impossible that at is in C or causes a variable in C, since otherwise oi (which causes
at) would cause other opinions. Therefore C blocks the path via clause (ii).
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Case 2 : the arrow between a1 and a2 points towards a1 (a1  a2). It is impossible
that between all neighbouring variables at;at+1 the arrow points towards at, since
otherwise oj would be a cause of oi. Let at be the earliest variable in the path such
that an arrow points from at to at+1. Notice the fork at 1  at ! at+1.
Subcase 2.1 : at 2 C. Then C blocks the path via clause (i).
Subcase 2.2 : at 62 C. Then at (which already causes oi) cannot also cause oj . So we
do not have a chain at ! at+1 ! :::! am. Choose as as the earliest variable among
at;at+1; :::;am 1 such that the arrow between as and as+1 points towards as. Note
the collider as 1 ! as  as+1. The variable as neither belongs to C nor causes a
member of C, since otherwise the variable at (which causes as) would belong to C.
Therefore C blocks the path via clause (ii).
Proof of part (b). Now suppose that x is not a common e¤ect of any opinions or
private causes thereof. We have to show that the opinions are independent conditional
on fxg [ C. Again by the blocking theorem(e.g., Pearl, 2000, Theorem 1.2.4), it
su¢ ces to show that fxg [ C blocks every path from an opinion to another opinion,
i.e., that for every such path
(i*) either the path contains a chain a! b! cor fork a b! csuch that b
is in fxg [ C
(ii*) or the path contains a collider a ! b  csuch that b is not in fxg [ C and
does not cause any variable in fxg [ C.
Consider any path (a1; :::;am) from an opinion oi (= a1) to another opinion oj
(= am).
Case 1 : the arrow between a1 and a2 points towards a2 (a1 ! a2). Construct a
collider at 1 ! at  at+1as in Case 1 of part (a). Again, at neither is in C nor
causes a variable in C.
Subcase 1.1 : at neither is x nor causes x. Then, in summary, at neither belongs to
fxg [ C nor causes a variable in fxg [ C. So, fxg [ C blocks the path via clause (ii*).
Subcase 1.2 : at is x or causes x. We cannot have arrows at  at+1  :::  am,
since otherwise at, and hence x, would be a common e¤ect of the opinions a1 (= oi)
and am (= oj). Let as be the earliest variable among at;at+1; :::;am 1 with an arrow
as ! as+1. Note the fork as 1  as ! as+1(see Figure A.1).
Subsubcase 1.2.1 : as 2 C. Then we are done as fxg [ C blocks the path via clause
(i*).
Subsubcase 1.2.2 : as 62 C. Then we do not have arrows as ! as+1 ! ::: ! am,
since rstly as does not commonly cause the opinion am (= oj) and another opinion
because as 62 C, and secondly as does not privately cause the opinion am because
otherwise at, and hence x, would be a common e¤ect of two variables (namely oi and
as) which are or privately cause distinct opinions. Given that we do not have arrows
as ! as+1 ! ::: ! am, there must be a variable ar among as+1; :::;am 1 with a
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Figure A.1: The path in Subcase 1.2.
collider ar 1 ! ar  ar+1. Let ar be the last such variable among as+1; :::;am 1.
Note that we either have arrows ar  ::: amor arrows ar  ::: ap ! :::! am
for some r < p < m (see Figure A.2). We may assume without loss of generality that
in the second case ap does not belong to C, since otherwise fxg [ C would block the
path via clause (i*). Now,
(*) ar does not belong to C (hence, does not cause a member of C),
In the case of ar  ::: amthis is because otherwise the opinion am (= oj) would
cause another opinion, and in the case of ar  :::  ap ! ::: ! amit is because
otherwise ap would belong to C. Notice further that ar is an e¤ect either of the
opinion am = oj (in the case of ar  ::: am) or of a private cause of this opinion
(in case of ar  ::: ap ! :::! am). From this it follows that
(**) ar is not x and does not cause x,
as otherwise x would be a common e¤ect of on the one hand (via ar) the opinion oj
or a private cause thereof, and on the other hand (via at) the opinion oi (= a1). By
(*) and (**), ar neither belongs to fxg [ C nor causes a member of fxg [ C. So, the
path is blocked via clause (ii*).
Case 2 : the arrow between a1 and a2 points towards a1 (a1  a2). Construct the
fork at 1  at ! at+1as in Case 2 of part (a).
Subcase 2.1 : at 2 fxg [ C. Then C blocks the path via clause (i*).
Subcase 2.2 : at 62 fxg [ C. Since in particular at 62 C, we can construct a collider
as 1 ! as  as+1as in Subcase 2.2 of part (a) (see Figure A.3), and again as
neither belongs to C nor causes a member of C.
Subsubcase 2.2.1 : as neither is nor causes x. Then, in summary, as neither is in nor
causes a variable of fxg [ C, and hence fxg [ C blocks the path via clause (ii*).
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Figure A.2: The path in Subsubcase 1.2.2.
Subsubcase 2.2.2 : as is or causes x. We cannot have arrows as  as+1  ::: am,
since otherwise x would be a common e¤ect (via as) of the opinion oj (= am) and
the private cause at of the opinion o1 (= a1). If we have arrows as  :::  aq !
::: ! amfor some s < q < m, then aq must be in C since otherwise aq would be a
private cause of the opinion am (= oj) so that x would be a common e¤ect of the
private causes aq and at; and since aq 1  aq ! aq+1 is a fork with aq 2 C we
are done by clause (i*). Now assume the remaining case that we neither have arrows
as  ::: amnor arrows as  ::: aq ! :::! am. There must be a variable ar
among as+1; :::;am 1 such that we have a collider ar 1 ! ar  ar+1. Choose ar to
be the latest variable among as+1; :::;am 1 with the collider property. Note that we
either have arrows ar  :::  amor arrows ar  :::  ap ! ::: ! amfor some
r < p < m (see Figure A.4). We may assume without loss of generality that in the
second case ap 62 C, as otherwise we would be done by clause (i*). Then
(***) ar does not belong to C (so, does not cause a member of C).
In the case of arrows ar  ::: amthe reason for (***) is that otherwise the opinion
am (= oj) would cause another opinion; and in the case of arrows ar  ::: ap !
::: ! amthe reason is that otherwise ap would belong to C. Note further that ar
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Figure A.3: The path in Subcase 2.2.
is caused either by the opinion am = oj (in the case of arrows ar  :::  am) or
by a private cause of this opinion (in case of arrows ar  :::  ap ! ::: ! am). It
follows that
(****) ar is not x and does not cause x,
since otherwise x would be a common e¤ect rstly (via ar) of the opinion oj or a
private cause thereof, and secondly (via as) of the private cause at of the opinion oi
(= a1). By (***) and (****), ar does not belong to or cause a member of fxg [ C.
So, the path is blocked via clause (ii*). 
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Figure A.4: The path in Subsubcase 2.2.2.
19
